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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The state appeals from the district court's order denying the state's motion
to amend and granting Gary Dean Blankenship's motion to dismiss the Amended
Information that charged him with rape.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Blankenship sexually abused his stepdaughter, B.C., for a number of
years, beginning when B.C. was approximately seven years old. (P.H. Tr., p.8,
Ls.8-11; p.28, Ls.7-8; p.29, Ls.2-14; p.40, L.24- p.41, L.3; p.61, Ls.17-21.) The
abuse culminated in the rape of B.C. in the spring of 1997, when B.C. was 16
years old. (P.H. Tr., p.12, L.7 - p.13, L.18; p.17, L.24 - p.22, L.15; p.29, Ls.1522.) B.C. disclosed the abuse to law enforcement for the first time many years
later, in 2012. (R., p.15; P.H. Tr., p.10, L.19-p.11, L.24.)
On March 15, 2012, the state filed a Criminal Complaint charging
Blankenship with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor under 16 years of age,
with Count I being alleged to have occurred "on or about 1988 through 1996" and
Count II being alleged to have occurred "on or about 1990." (R., pp.7-8.) Upon
recognizing that the crimes charged were barred by the applicable statute of
limitations, the state filed an Amended Criminal Complaint, on May 30, 2012,
alleging a single count of rape, in violation of Idaho Code§ 18-1601. (R., pp.4445.) Specifically, the amended complaint alleged:
The Defendant, Gary Dean Blankenship, on or about
Spring 1997, in the County of Bonner, State of Idaho, did penetrate
the vaginal opening of [B.C.], a female person, with his penis and

1

where [B.C.] was under the age of Eighteen (18) years, to-wit; of
the age of Fifteen (15) or Sixteen (16) years old, and where
Defendant at the time of the commission of the act was
approximately Thirty-four (34) years of age.
(R., p.44 (emphasis original).) Following a preliminary hearing, the magistrate

found probable cause to believe the crime had been committed and bound
Blankenship over on the charge. (R., pp.46-56; see also P.H. Tr., p.73, L.22 p.75, L.2.)
The state thereafter filed its Information and, subsequently, an Amended
Information, charging Blankenship with rape.

(R., pp.59-62.)

Both the

Information and the Amended Information used the same charging language that
was contained in the Amended Criminal Complaint.
pp.59-61.)

(Compare R., p.44 with

On July 11, 2012, Blankenship filed a Motion to Dismiss and a

memorandum in support thereof, asserting as the basis for dismissal that
"prosecution of the alleged crime is barred by the Statute of Limitations." (R.,
pp. 75-80.)

Specifically, Blankenship argued that because the Amended

Information alleged a rape on the theory that B.C. was "under the age of
Eighteen (18) years," the five-year limitation period for bringing a statutory rape
charge applied and prevented the prosecution of Blankenship for the charged
crime. 1

(R., pp.77-80; 8/9/12 Tr., p.3, L.5 - p.4, L.23.)

The state opposed

Blankenship's Motion to Dismiss and also filed its own motion to amend the

1

Idaho Code § 19-402(1) establishes a five-year limitation period for the
prosecution of "any felony other than murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape
pursuant to section 18-6101 2., 3., 4., 5. or 7., or section 18-6108, Idaho Code
.... " A prosecution for statutory rape pursuant to I.C. § 18-6101(1) is not
excepted from the five-year limitation period.
2

Information, for a second time, "to more specifically allege facts constituting the
alleged crime for which the Defendant has been charged."

(R., p.103.)

Specifically, the state sought to amend the charging document to allege facts
constituting forcible rape, a charge that the state asserted was both supported by
the evidence at the preliminary hearing and not barred by the statute of
limitations. 2 (8/9/12 Tr., p.9, L.11 - p.13, L.4.)
After a hearing, the district court denied the state's motion to amend the
Information and granted Blankenship's motion to dismiss.

(R., pp.105-13.)

Regarding the state's motion to amend, the district court concluded that allowing
the proposed amendment to allege forcible rape would prejudice Blankenship's
substantial rights because he was not put on notice, before the preliminary
hearing, that he would have to defend against a forcible rape charge and was
therefore denied the right of cross examination. (R., pp.109-10.) The court also
concluded that the evidence presented by the state at the preliminary hearing
was not sufficient to support a charge of forcible rape.

(R., pp.110-11.)

Regarding Blankenship's motion to dismiss, the court concluded that the
prosecution of Blankenship for the rape of B.C. in the Spring of 1997, on the
charged theory that B.C. was "under the age of Eighteen (18) years," was barred
by the five-year limitation period applicable to statutory rape.

(R., pp.111-12.)

The court thus dismissed the case without prejudice, stating in conclusion that, "if
the prosecution concludes there are sufficient facts to charge Mr. Blankenship

2

Pursuant to I.C. § 19-401, "[t]here is no limitation of time within which a
prosecution for" forcible rape, I.C. § 18-6101(3) and/or (4), "must be
commenced."
3

with Forcible Rape, it can pursue this new charge in accordance with the
requirements of constitutional due process."
appealed. (R., pp.121-23.)

4

(R., p.113.)

The state timely

ISSUE

Did the district court apply an incorrect legal standard and, therefore,
abuse its discretion by dismissing the Information rather than allowing an
amendment?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Applied An Incorrect Legal Standard And, Therefore, Abused
Its Discretion By Dismissing The Information Rather Than Permitting The State's
Proposed Amendment
A.

Introduction
The district court denied amendment of the Information from "statutory"

rape to forcible rape 3 on two bases: First, it concluded that allowing the
amendment would deny Blankenship the right of cross examination. Second, it
concluded the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing was insufficient to
support a finding of probable cause for forcible rape.

(R., pp.109-11.)

The

district court erred in respect to both rulings. As to the first basis, it is well settled
that the right of confrontation does not apply to pretrial probable cause
determinations at preliminary hearings or grand juries, and therefore Blankenship
had no right to cross examination that could have been denied.

As to the

second, the district court again applied an incorrect legal standard instead of the
two-prong test of whether the amendment charged a different or additional
offense and whether the proposed amendment would prejudice the defendant's
ability to defend himself at trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision whether to allow the state to amend an Information is a

matter within the discretion of the trial court. State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839,

The state does not challenge on appeal that the statutory rape charge was
barred by the statute of limitation. It does not appear from the record that
Blankenship has contended that a forcible rape charge would be barred by the
applicable statute of limitation.
3

6

655 P.2d 46 (1982); State v. Tribe, 126 Idaho 610, 888 P.2d 389 (Ct. App.
1994).

In evaluating whether the trial court abused its discretion, this Court

considers (1) whether the trial court perceived the issue as discretionary; (2)
whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent
with any applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the trial court exercised
reason in reaching its decision. State v. Miller, 133 Idaho 454, 456, 988 P.2d
680, 682 (1999) (citation omitted).

C.

The District Court Erred As A Matter Of Law When It Concluded That The
Amendment Would Deprive Blankenship Of The Right To Cross Examine
The State's Witnesses At The Preliminary Hearing Because Confrontation
Is A Trial Right Inapplicable At The Probable Cause Stage Of Criminal
Proceedings
"The court may permit a complaint, an information or indictment to be

amended at any time before the prosecution rests if no additional or different
offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced."
I.C.R. ?(e).

"The rule's reference to prejudice to substantial rights means

prejudice to the defendant's ability to defend against the charge."

State v.

Herrera, 152 Idaho 24, 31, 266 P.3d 499, 506 (Ct. App. 2011) (emphasis added).
Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether the amendment would prejudice the
defendant at trial.

kl ("Herrera has shown

no trial prejudice" (emphasis added)).

The court found that Blankenship suffered prejudice to his "substantial
right to due process" because he was not provided notice that the state intended
to proceed under a forcible rape theory and therefore "did not cross-examine the
State's witnesses on these issues." (R., p.110.) The district court erred because

7

the right to confrontation did not apply to Blankenship's preliminary hearing, and
cross examination at a preliminary hearing is not prerequisite to a fair trial.
"[T]he right to confrontation is a trial right, designed to prevent improper
restrictions on the types of questions that defense counsel may ask during crossexamination."

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52 (1987) (emphasis

original) (citations omitted) (holding that "the Confrontation Clause only protects
a defendant's trial rights, and does not compel the pretrial production of
information that might be useful in preparing for trial").

This interpretation

extends beyond pretrial discovery to preliminary hearings. See Graves v. State,
307 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Tex. App. 2010) (in holding that the right to confront does
not attach until trial, noted that "[m]any other jurisdictions have held that the
federal Confrontation Clause does not apply to preliminary hearings"); Oakes v.
Commonwealth, 320 S.W.3d 50, 55 (Kentucky 2010) (holding as a matter of first
impression that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to pre-trial hearings, a
holding consistent with "every other state ruling on this issue reject[ing] claims
that the Confrontation Clause applies to pre-trial hearings); State v. Timmerman,
218 P.3d 590, 594 (Utah 2009) ("[W]e hold that the federal Confrontation Clause
does not apply to preliminary hearings. In so doing, we note that a substantial
number of jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion."). Indeed, if the right
to cross examination at a preliminary hearing were required by due process for
the fairness of a trial, the state would be prohibited from proceedings by grand
jury. Idaho Const., Art. I, § 8 (state may proceed in criminal case by Information
or Indictment).

8

The district court erred when it held that cross examination at the
preliminary hearing was required for Blankenship to obtain a fair trial. Because
the only prejudice identified by the trial court was not prejudicial as a matter of
law, the district court erred when it denied the requested amendment.

D.

The District Court's Alternative Holding That The Amendment Is Not
Supported By The Evidence Of The Preliminary Hearing Is Also
Erroneous
The district court alternatively held that the amendment should be denied

because "the State did not elicit sufficient evidence to support a charge of
forcible rape." (R., pp.110-11.) This analysis is wrong because the district court
did not apply the proper legal standard for ruling on a motion to amend.
Alternatively, the district court erred in concluding the evidence did not support
probable cause to believe that Blankenship raped the victim.
As set forth above, the proper test for allowing an amendment is two-fold:
whether the proposed amendment charges an "additional or different offense"
and whether the proposed amendment prejudices the "substantial rights of the
defendant."

I.C.R. 7(e).

The district court did not apply this test when it

concluded the state had failed to establish probable cause.

(R., pp.110-11.)

Application of the correct legal standard shows that the district court erred.
First, it is well established in Idaho that an amendment from one type of
rape to another does not charge an additional or different offense.

State v.

LaMere, 103 Idaho 839, 842 n.4, 655 P.2d 46, 49 n.4 (1982) (amending
Information from forcible rape to statutory rape did not allege a different crime);
State v. Banks, 113 Idaho 54, 56-57, 740 P.2d 1039, 1041-42 (Ct. App. 1987)
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(amending Information from forcible rape to statutory rape did not charge
different crime because there was only one rape).

The sufficiency of the

evidence presented at the preliminary hearing is irrelevant to this inquiry.
The sufficiency of the evidence at the preliminary hearing is also
irrelevant to the second prong of the test, whether Blankenship would be
prejudiced at trial. "The rule's reference to prejudice to substantial rights means
prejudice to the defendant's ability to defend against the charge."

State v.

Herrera, 152 Idaho 24, 31,266 P.3d 499,506 (Ct. App. 2011) (emphasis added).
The district court made no analysis of how review of the evidence at the
preliminary hearing would affect Blankenship's ability to defend himself at trial,
and indeed, there is nothing in the record to suggest that a new preliminary
hearing would in any way facilitate Blankenship's trial preparation.
The district court in this instance did not apply the well-established twoprong test for amendment when it reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence at the
preliminary hearing. It therefore abused its discretion.
Even if the sufficiency of the evidence at the preliminary hearing were
relevant to the motion to amend the district court erred.

The purpose of the

preliminary hearing is quite limited. State v. Williams, 103 Idaho 635, 644-45,
651 P.2d 569, 578-79 (Ct. App. 1982), overruled on other grounds State v.
Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 685 P.2d 837 (Ct. App. 1984). The finding of probable
cause must be based upon substantial evidence on every material element of
the offense charged, and this test may be satisfied through circumstantial
evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. State v. Reyes, 139

10

Idaho 502, 504, 80 P.3d 1103, 1105 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Munhall, 118 Idaho
602, 606, 798 P.2d 61, 65 (Ct. App. 1990). The state is not required to produce
all of its evidence at a preliminary examination. Carey v. State, 91 Idaho 706,
709, 429 P.2d 836, 839 (1967). Rather, the state need only show that a crime
was committed and that there is probable cause to believe the accused
committed· it. State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 54, 57, 675 P.2d 33, 36 (1983) ("it is
sufficient to state that the evidence produced by the State at the preliminary
hearing established that a crime had been committed and a reasonable person
would believe that Gibson had probably or likely participated in the commission
of the offense charged"). Reviewing courts will not substitute their judgment for
that of the magistrate as to the weight of the evidence and a probable cause
finding will not be disturbed if any reasonable view of the evidence, including
permissible inferences, support findings that the offense occurred and the
accused committed it.

kl

(citing State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 299, 912

P.2d 664, 667 (Ct. App. 1995)).
The state moved to amend to forcible rape under the theory that the
victim's resistance was overcome by force or violence or that she was prevented
from resistance due to threat.

I.C. § 18-6101 (3) or (4) (1994).

The victim

testified at the preliminary hearing that Blankenship, her stepfather, "raped [her]."
(P.H. Tr., p.12, L.20.) She was "[a]pproximately 16," and a sophomore in high
school.

(P.H. Tr., p.13, Ls.3-6; p.18, Ls.4-6.)

He went to her bedroom,

undressed, and told her he "wanted to take [her] virginity." (P.H. Tr., p.18, Ls.1523.) He stated he "knew that [she] wanted it." (P.H. Tr., p.198, L.24 - p.19, L.5.)
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He then either took off her clothes or "made [her] take off [her] clothes."

(P.H.

Tr., p.19, Ls.5-9.) He then put his penis in her vagina "very forcefully."

(P.H.

Tr., p.20, Ls.1-5.)

She did not fight him because she knew that would be

"useless" because of prior physical and sexual abuse over the course of several
years.

(P.H. Tr., p.21, Ls.11-24; p.26, L.5-24; p.28, Ls.7-10; p.29, Ls.10-14;

p.40, L.22 - p.41, L.8; p.47, Ls.19-22; p.49, Ls.11-24; p.50, L.22 - p.51, L.6;
p.61, L.3 - p.62, L.13.) Given the history of abuse by which the victim learned it
was useless to physically resist, the youth and inexperience of the victim, and
the testimony that Blankenship penetrated her "very forcefully," the district court
erred by concluding that the state had not met the relatively low threshold of
establishing probable cause.
Because the amendment would not, as a matter of law, have charged an
"additional or different offense" and would not have prejudiced the "substantial
rights of the defendant" to a fair trial, the district court erred by denying the
amendment.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's
order denying the state's motion to amend and granting Blankenship's motion to

12

dismiss, and that the case be remanded for further proceedings on the Second
Amended Information.
DATED this 26th day of March 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of March 2013, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
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ATTORNEY AT LAW
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